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ABSTRACT 
 
This article was prepared for a 2018 conference convened at AIR University 
Islamabad on ‚Radicalization: Perceptions, Realities and Challenges of Campus 
Life‛. Focussing on a conference sub-theme of ‚culture‛, the article reviews 
academic literature on the topic of youth radicalization, noting where existing 
analyses and proposed strategies largely geared to European and American 
contexts are either relevant for or unsuited to Pakistani universities and 
colleges. In addition, the concept of ‚culture‛ is addressed, whether in terms of 
local customs, creative expression, or sociological affinity groups, with special 
attention paid to discussions of the relationship of culture to Islam. The intent is 
to clarify the roles and responsibilities of Pakistani campus leaders to cultivate 
positive spaces for student life and expression in culturally authentic ways. In 
fact, the potentially positive aspects of ‚radical‛ student learning and 
engagement in the sense of ‚getting to the root or source‛ that are part of 
university education need to be recognized and preserved, so that youth are 
empowered to effectively participate, question, and critique rather than resorting 
to violent options. 
 
Keywords:  Radicalization, Pakistani Universities, Campus cultures, Islam 
and Culture. 
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Introduction 
The terms ‘radicalization’ and ‘deradicalization’ are derived largely from 
sources in Europe and North America. While today the specter of terrorism and 
radicalism in the West is disproportionately associated with Islam and Muslims, 
it is acknowledged that other causes can also lead to violent attacks on civilians, 
for example, the rise of the far right or even radical environmentalism. 
 Radicalism, like extremism and even terrorism, is a contested and 
constructed term. This problematic has been well and ably discussed in the 
existing literature. The term ‘radical’ can have a positive or progressive 
connotation as well since, after all, it means going back to the source—and who 
gets to define what is radical? ‘Extremism’ similarly assumes a consensual 
normal or middle ground, and while most religious traditions uphold the middle 
way as normative—there is considerable disagreement about who gets to define 
what this core or middle ground is. As a concept ‘radicalisation’ tends to merge a 
number of meanings—disaffection, youth alienation, radical dissent, religious 
fundamentalism, propensity to violence—which ought to be kept analytically 
distinct.‛1 
 Literature on recruitment to extremist groups has isolated many complex 
factors in this process and also distinguishes between radical ideas and actions 
that cause harm through violent means. For example, P. R Neumann argues that 
there are two types of radicalization: processes resulting in ‘cognitive extremism’ 
and those resulting in ‘behavioral extremism’.2 Both, however, are usually 
summarized as what happens before the ‘bomb goes off’.3 There is also a large 
body of work discussing changes in the number and sources of such attacks over 
time and how factors of modernity and even post-modernity could be 
responsible for these changes. 
 Pakistan is a nation that has suffered disproportionately from terrorist and 
extremist attacks. Recent statistics (2016) say that about 7% of the terror attacks 
worldwide occurred in Pakistan, which had the fourth highest total number of 
incidents after Iraq, Afghanistan, and India.4 One can follow increases in such 
attacks over time beginning from a handful in the years before 1986 to 60 in that 
year, such that by 2006 numbers had risen to 164, then they reached over 600 in the 
years after 2009, with a height of 2214 in 2013.5 A further statistic cites a total of 
35,000 Pakistanis killed in extremist attacks between Sept. 11, 2001 and May 2011. 
Factors usually associated with this rise in violent attacks include an increased 
presence of arms after the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s participation in the 
War on Terror post 9/11.6 A 2015 paper authored by Pakistani scholars found local 
experts ranking causes of extremist or radical attacks as follows: lack of law 
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enforcement, poverty, Pakistan’s participation in war on terror, foreign involvement, 
unemployment, corruption, ethnic strife, illiteracy, and ethnic or linguistic 
separatism.7 
 While the idea that poverty on its own inspires violence and radical 
responses within societies has largely been debunked,8 there has been in the 
popular imagination a sense that individuals who can be most easily recruited to 
violence are those who have the least to loose materially and socially, and also 
that lower levels of education make individuals more susceptible to 
indoctrination and manipulation. 
 In fact we need to be cautious in trying to generalize understandings of 
the roots of terrorism and radicalization that have cultural specificity and 
distinctiveness. As a non-Pakistani observer, it appears to me that recent 
concerns with radicalization on campuses in the Pakistani environment arise due 
to the prevalent perception that extremism generally emerges among the least 
privileged. Note that among the top causes for terrorism cited by Pakistan 
scholars as previously cited were: poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy. Both 
globally and in Pakistan, however, this has proven not to be the case.9 
 As for the campus component, considering the history of student political 
activism in Pakistan as opposed to extremism, easily demonstrates that 
university students can be and have been mobilized at various periods in the 
nation’s history.10 Similar to the case in other countries, there has been an ebb 
and flow to this phenomenon, some of it associated with interventions by the 
Pakistani state and some of it due to shifts in the political mood in the country. In 
general, we may observe that student and youth activism and protests in 
developing societies such as Pakistan have had a greater impact on national 
politics and society. Many of these same societies are experiencing a ‘youth 
bulge’ today, as opposed to aging populations in Europe and North America. 
 It seems that several 2017 incidents in Pakistan sparked media and public 
awareness of college campuses as potential sites for recruitment and 
radicalization and this has occasioned some soul searching as to the potential 
causes. The theme of this conference in terms of ‘radicalization’ is to consider 
and propose initiatives that might address these causes, especially in campus 
environments, and hopefully offer solutions to a perceived trend. Of course, it is 
probably more effective to take steps to curtail radicalization (i.e. counter-
radicalization measures) in the first place, since once individuals become 
radicalized, the road to recovery is a long and intervention intensive one. 
 In this paper I will discuss some of the literature in the field of terrorism 
and deradicalization studies. My position as a professor of Islamic Studies in the 
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West, rather than a scholar of terrorism, leads me to be somewhat critical of the 
generalizations of Western strategies and experiences to the Pakistan case. Much 
of the material on terrorism/radicalization that has been produced in Europe, the 
United States, and Canada features theories that tend to focus on factors such as 
the alienation of minority [Muslim] youth populations. At the same time, 
keeping in mind that any act of violence is an affront to our common humanity, 
we must acknowledge the reality of the damage to families and societies that is 
being caused by youth recruited to commit acts of violence, and be willing to 
identify causal factors and how to address them. 
 The very topic of radicalization on college campuses directs our attention 
to the fact that radicalism is primarily associated with youthful populations. 
There are various explanations for this—both folk and academic. At the level of 
folk wisdom, youth have ‚less to lose‛ in the sense of usually not yet having the 
responsibilities of their own families and children to support. Also youth are 
perceived as being more impulsive and volatile as well as looking for some sort 
of overreaching cause that will draw together all the complexities of life and offer 
a clear and compelling solution. 
 At the academic level explanations of why youth become radical include 
observations that, 
 
Late adolescence and early adulthood is the time when young people solidify 
their political and social identities. The desire of youth to belong and be 
accepted also increases their vulnerability to recruitment since in order to 
both demonstrate and realize belonging in a group, it is important that 
young people conform to and act upon the values of that group. For many 
young people, belonging is far more important than believing. That is, they 
come to articulate the values of a group because they want to belong.11 
 
 In the scholarly literature produced in the West, explanations for 
radicalization usually assume Muslim immigrant backgrounds for vulnerable 
youth, for example, the concept of ‚acculturation stress‛. This is a construct 
proposed by psychologist A. Ryder12 that attempts to capture what youth from 
Muslim immigrant backgrounds may be experiencing that would incline them to 
become radicalized. ‚This set includes all the elements related to the emotional 
sphere that push youth from different cultural, social and economic backgrounds 
towards radical forms of Islam.‛13 Acculturation was defined decades ago as a 
‚phenomenon that results when groups of individuals having different cultures 
come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in the original 
culture patterns of either or both groups‛.14 This interaction usually generates 
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stress on the people involved and may lead to negative consequences.15 
According to this theory, such immigrant youth are said to be caught between 
two cultures, or culturally ‘bipolar’, leading to their search for some overarching 
cause or commitment. 
 Michael Hogg, another scholar of radicalization, lists certain explanatory 
factors that may work cross-culturally, in particular ones around what he terms 
‘identity uncertainty’.16 Hogg argues that the quest for personal significance 
constitutes a major motivational force that may push individuals toward violent 
extremism.  
 Kruglanski, a psychologist who works on deradicalization, summarizes 
various causal factors as follows:  
 
Our radicalization/deradicalization model contains three crucial 
components: (1) the motivational component (the quest for personal 
significance) that defines a goal to which one may be committed, (2) the 
ideological component that in addition identifies the means of violence as 
appropriate for this goal's pursuit, and (3) the social process of networking 
and group dynamics through which the individual comes to share in the 
violence-justifying ideology and proceeds to implement it as a means of 
significance gain.17 
 
 Scholars of youth radicalization in the West have further identified 
various ‚environmental factors in radicalization‛ i.e., reasons that youth may 
become politically disaffected. Among them are government policies that play a 
pivotal role by having a strong impact on the person’s perceptions, sense of 
belonging, and affection towards the host country. In particular, two sets of 
policies seem to be very relevant, foreign policy and integration policy. 
Dissatisfaction with foreign policy can cause rage, anger, and frustration towards 
the host country and might work as a catalyst towards radicalization. The realm 
of integration of new immigrants may either be ignored or involve invasive 
scrutiny and demonization.18 While such theories and explanations may 
potentially stigmatize Muslim youth in particular, scholars such as Arun 
Kundnani do not hesitate to point out that ‚what governments call extremism is 
to a large degree a product of their own wars‛.19 
 The question for us to raise here is, are any of these factors and theories 
relevant to the Pakistani situation? The thesis of being a member of a stigmatized 
minority, for example, does not seem to apply in most cases of the radicalized, 
nor do concepts of ‘acculturation stress’. More broad and applicable to at least 
 some features of the Pakistani experience are observations such as the following:  
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Violent extremism can be best conceptualized as a kaleidoscope of complex 
interlocking combinations: 1) individual socio- psychological factors; 2) 
social factors; 3) political factors; 4) ideological and religious dimensions; 5) 
the role of culture and identity issues; 6) trauma and other trigger 
mechanisms; and three other factors that are a motor for radicalization: 7) 
group dynamics; 8) radicalizers/groomers; and 9) the role of social media. It 
is the combined interplay of economic grievances; a sense of injustice and 
discrimination; personal crisis and tragedies; frustration; alienation; a 
fascination with violence; searching for answers to the meaning of life; an 
identity crisis; social exclusion; alienation; marginalization; disappointment 
with democratic ideology or social network of power and control; a sense of 
loyalty and commitment; a sense of excitement and adventure; a 
romanticized view of ideology and cause; the possibility of heroism, personal 
redemption, etc.‚20 
 
         Such broad and variegated factors seem more likely to apply across cultures 
and situations but, unfortunately, would not give much assistance in anticipating 
individual cases of radicalization or a propensity to take violent action. 
 In a paper on youth radicalization in Pakistan authored for the US based 
Brookings Institute, Political Scientist Moeed Yusuf articulated some analytical 
factors more relevant to cases in Muslim majority societies. 
 
Youth radicalization is inherently tied to the issue of expectations of the 
young men in a population. Educational attainment presents itself as a 
double-edged sword. While a lack of education disqualifies youth from 
attaining economic mobility and is thus undesirable, a high level of 
education without the requisite outlet to apply skills raises expectations 
which, if unfulfilled for long, can create an expectation-reality disconnect. 
The latter is considered to be a common violence-inducing factor among 
youth in a society. 21  
 
 A pioneering study in the field of the radicalization of youth in Muslim 
societies was prepared by Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim in the 
1980s,22 a time when Egypt had been rocked by violent attacks by factions such 
as the Jamā‘at al-Takfīr wa-l-Hijra. Interviewing young members of such 
movements in Egyptian prisons led Ibrahim to conclude that the stress of 
migration from rural to urban settings and, ironically, exposure to (poorly 
delivered) higher education in state universities that had become much more 
widely available in recent decades, was a source of disorientation and search for 
meaning among such youth. While trained in engineering or mathematics, they 
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were ill equipped to deal with broader issues of interpretation and saw religion, 
specifically an Islamist view of political Islam that offered a blueprint for a 
utopian state and social order, as a panacea for the ills of their own society, while 
being at the same time a resolution to their personal inner turmoil and 
dissatisfaction. This became the paradigmatic explanation for radicalization 
among educated youth in Muslim societies. For example, Peter Bergen and Swati 
Pandey in a much later study calculated that that 70 out of the world’s 79 leading 
Muslim terrorists (that is, 89%) were drawn from those having backgrounds in 
modern mixed (religious and scientific) education.23 Such individuals are, in fact, 
the majority of graduates in most Muslim majority contexts such as Pakistan.24 
 
Radicalization and Universities 
 Academic literature on radicalization identifies contributing factors such 
as exposure to ideology, victimization, alienation, socialization, social networks, 
the internet, deficiencies in family bonds, trauma, relative social and economic 
deprivation, and ‘cultures of violence’.25 This broad-brush approach has 
encouraged governments to believe that they can pre-empt future terrorist 
attacks through a range of interventions in everyday life. However, as this list of 
possible causes indicates, the pathways of radicalization have yet to be 
identified, much less the correct points in which to interrupt the process. Indeed, 
research on radicalization processes and vulnerable populations are best 
summarized as ‘exploratory’ rather than ‘explanatory’.26 
 As the processes involved remain undetermined, radicalization is 
frequently reduced to the profiling of traits or attributions of signs of 
radicalization in ‘vulnerable’ or ‘at-risk’ populations. In the West, these signs are 
typically associated with certain ‘types’ of Muslims – bearded men, veiled 
women, converts27 due to an assumed conflict between ‘Muslimness’ and a 
Western identity thereby conflating Islam with ‘radicalization’ and ‘terrorism’. 
Consequently concerns about ‘radicalization’ were extended to stigmatize a way 
of life rather than specific behaviors or actions, which then allowed for the 
securitization of ordinary and unexceptional lives, including those of students.28 
The irony is that attending university is normally viewed as a sign of social and 
economic success, yet it is also viewed as a site and trigger of radicalization for 
Muslims.29 In a notable case from the United States, the New York Police 
Department surveilled Muslim Student Associations on a range of college 
campuses over an extended period of time including monitoring university 
websites from Yale; Columbia; the University of Pennsylvania; Syracuse; New 
York University; Clarkson University; the Newark and New Brunswick 
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campuses of Rutgers University; the State University of New York campuses in 
Buffalo, Albany, Stony Brook and Potsdam; Queens College, Baruch College, 
Brooklyn College and La Guardia Community College, and actual meetings and 
students within the city limits and in other areas of the state.30 Meanwhile, in 
Britain, the passing of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act in February 2015, 
and in particular its section on ‚Preventing People from Being Drawn into 
Terrorism‛ initially mandated that those working at universities should report 
any suspicious activity on the part of students, although this provision was 
ultimately criticized and revised.31 
 Such cases in the West highlight ‚the inherent tensions facing those 
involved in higher education internationally, who on the one hand are dedicated 
to promoting academic freedom, free speech, intellectual curiosity, healthy 
discussion and critical thinking, while at the same time preventing, restricting –
and possibly reporting –extremist, radical and intolerant ideas or behavior. This 
difficult balance is further complicated by the fact that not all radical ideas, or 
even radicalization of individuals, necessarily lead to violence. Healthy academic 
debate and argument can often prove a powerful counter to extremist ideas.‛32 
 
Pakistani College Campuses 
 Since this conference is directed to college campuses in Pakistan—let us 
now consider the Pakistani context. In the case of Pakistan, college students have 
often been highly involved in political and religious movements, being active 
and willing to mobilize. Sometimes this level of commitment led to internal 
tensions and even violence on campuses, in particular across left and right wing 
groups, or religious versus secular factions.   
 Writing about Pakistan student politics, Matthew Nelson noted 
differences across those students who pressed for the creation of an explicitly 
secular state (for example, the left-leaning Democratic Students Federation); and 
others who pressed for a modern ‘Islamic’ state (the Islāmī Jamī‘at-e-Ṭalabā’). 
Some embraced a ‘sectarian’ agenda (for example, the Imāmia Students 
Organization); and some held fast to specific ‘ethnic’ or ‘regional’ demands (the 
Baloch Students Organization and the Pakhtun Students Federation). In each 
case, however, the question was generally the same: who defines the nation/who 
controls the state?33 In fact, after 1958, student politics throughout Pakistan were 
dominated by a bitter struggle between the left-leaning National Student 
Federation and Maulānā Mawdūdī’s (Islamist) Islāmī Jamī‘at-e-Ṭalabā’.34 In 1984 
Zia-ul-Haq banned student unions as a source of potential opposition and 
activism. They were allowed again in 1988 under a new regime. However, 
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violent clashes resurfaced at large public campuses such that middle class 
families increasingly preferred private universities for their children. 
 An article in Dawn commented on the perception among Pakistani law 
enforcement that universities were now cites of recruitment to extremism. 
‚Sources privy to the findings say the study considered a sample of 500 
‘hardcore militants’ currently in Sindh's jails. It revealed that at least 64 such 
militants had master’s level degrees or above. As many as 70 ‘hardcore militants’ 
had bachelor’s degrees, while 63 had matriculate and intermediate degrees.‛35  
          Surveillance on Pakistani campuses is also nothing new. It is reported that: 
 
Since the launch of the government’s National Action Plan to counter 
terrorism in December 2014, the BZU [Bahāuddīn Zakariyya] campus and 
its 35,000-strong student body have been under 24-hour surveillance. 
Intelligence agency officials have also been stationed at the university to 
monitor militant activities, particularly recruitment, that may be 
underway.36 
 
A further article highlights the trend to recruitment to extremist groups 
among educated populations and potentially on Pakistan’s campuses: 
 
A 2013 study on the anti-India group Lashkar-e-Ṭaibah (LeT) found that its 
recruits tend to be more educated than the average Pakistani. Sixty-three 
percent have secondary education, and some have enrolled in undergraduate 
degree programs.37 Another study found that 17 percent of LeT militants are 
educated to the intermediate level or higher.38As madrassas, the traditional 
recruiting grounds of militant groups, come under greater government 
scrutiny under the National Action Plan to counter terrorism, and as 
urbanization drives the growth of Pakistan’s middle class, university 
students are likely to be increasingly coveted by militant recruiters.39 
  
Pakistani journalist Huma Yusuf clearly expects the liberal context of 
private elite universities such as the Lahore University of Management Sciences 
to provide a more effective counter to radicalization and extremism. Yusuf 
further observes that public campuses can also provide positive environments in 
this regard, but that this depends on individual faculty and student attitudes 
rather than systematic planning. 
 
In interviews with students studying history and political science at a 
public university in Lahore, I found them openly debating and challenging 
the religious framing of the Pakistani national narrative. The main factors 
that influenced them were studying the politics and history of other parts of 
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the world, and a professor who engaged with them and taught them to 
question prevalent narratives. But students in most engineering universities 
and medical colleges face the same indoctrination in Pakistan’s ‚ideology‛ 
that they did in high school. And student wings of Islamist parties—in 
particular the Jamāt-e-Islāmī’s student wing, the Islāmī Jamī‘at-e-Ṭalabā’—
threaten progressive discourse on many university campuses. They aim to 
disrupt cultural events and prevent meaningful debate.‛40 
  
An article by Pakistan-based Madiha Afzal published by the Voice of America 
reached a similar conclusion that colleges where creativity, openness, and expressing 
counter-narratives were promoted could constitute potential sites for countering 
radicalization by virtue of the campus environments themselves. 
 
Education experts say it’s important to build a counter-narrative and 
cultivate an environment where youth can openly engage in conversations 
on issues considered taboo in Pakistan. They believe outdated teaching 
methods, lack of development of new skills, and absence of sports and 
extracurricular activities lead to frustration allow youth to gravitate toward 
violent terrorism.41  
 
A prevalent perception is that, ‚The education system of Pakistan does 
not train a student in logical/scientific inference or critical thinking. So he’s 
unable to critically dissect the indoctrinating patterns.‛42 Faculty and 
educationists therefore call for changing the curriculum and mass engagement at 
the national level towards deradicalization. This should ‚involve teachers, 
religious scholars, mosques, state, security forces – everyone.‛ 43 
 
Campuses and Cultures 
 It is clear that in viewing campuses as potential sites for discouraging, 
rather than encouraging radicalization; cultures play a critical role. The term 
‚culture‛ has many definitions and connotations, academic and popular.  Most 
relevant for us is its most general meaning of what people, usually a particular 
ethnic, local, or interest group, do.  In this sense we may think of the expressions 
‚foreign cultures‛, ‚popular culture‛, ‚the dominant culture‛ or ‚youth 
culture‛.  A second use of culture that developed in Europe during the 18th and 
early 19th centuries is more evaluative as in ‚high culture‛, or being 
‚cultured‛.44 Sociologists may use the term in yet a further sense of group or 
institutional practices and tastes as in sub-cultures, counter-cultures, and yes—
campus cultures. In this respect distinctive campus cultures need to be 
recognized and their potentials and threats taken into account. What positive 
practices can be implemented in this regard? 
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 Most educationists believe that the humanities, and yes, the social 
sciences, fields that offer ‘cultural experiences’ and tools for reflection and 
analysis should be part of every education. Here at Air University we are 
preaching to the choir since sponsorship of this conference comes on the part of 
the Humanities Department that offers relevant courses in fields such as 
Literature, Philosophy, Pakistan Studies, Islamiyat, Ethics, Psychology, and 
Sociology.45 
 In considering potential deradicalization measures on campus then, we 
must ask—which kind of campus—and clearly, it is not the campus itself that is 
doing the radicalizing. What is or is not available at a particular institution that 
might prevent or discourage radical tendencies and channel student energies in 
more constructive directions? So—while on campus we may reject ‚surveillance 
and curtailment of free speech and open inquiry‛, we also need to take proactive 
measures to build on the skills and tastes of existing programs, faculty, and 
students.  
 When it comes to the topic of Islam, we find striking differences between 
the situation of Pakistani students and Muslim students in the West. Ideas about 
Islam in Pakistan are much more likely to be charged and possibly even tabooed 
from open discussion—either out of fear of stirring up conflict or oneself being 
threatened and stigmatized, especially if one is from a minority sect of Islam or a 
non-Muslim, or if one is a liberal or free thinker, and perhaps, depending on the 
campus culture, if one prefers a certain Islamic scholar or preacher to another. In 
an article based on interviews with Pakistani parents regarding their educational 
choices for their children, religion was considered of importance by a very high 
proportion.  At the same time, presenting diverse views about religion was not 
considered desirable by most. 
 Nelson observes: 
 
Indeed, as my research unfolded, I quickly discovered that it was not any 
specific expression of religious or sectarian difference, but rather the terms of 
difference itself, that left my [Pakistani] respondents feeling uneasy and 
uncomfortable. In fact, I discovered, difference itself was the thing that most 
of my respondents had been taught to regard as undesirable, unacceptable 
and, at some level, ostensibly ‘un-Islamic’.46 
 
 While in the West symbols of Muslim identity may in some cases lead to 
marginalization of Muslim youth or surveillance; in contemporary Pakistan, the 
exalted position of religion as part of the national narrative and identity can 
unfortunately lead to it becoming a source of conflict. Here we have the link to 
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identity—and most psychologists understand that threats to identity may 
destabilize individuals and provoke emotional or even violent responses. 
 But let’s take for example, the case that campuses might attract elements 
that wish to recruit students to radical or extreme causes. The state, or the college 
administration working with the state may agree to surveillance, banning certain 
groups or individuals, and not allowing certain ideas to be expressed. 
 However, on the positive side what could be done? We note that there is 
another branch of literature that has to do with educational policy such as how to 
design and offer a curriculum that could ideally provide individuals with the 
intellectual resources that would preclude their becoming radicalized—i.e., that 
would lead them to interrogate simplistic solutions, challenge demonizing 
stereotypes of others, while giving them a sense of their personal and historical 
contexts, thereby preventing them from thinking in essentialist and totalizing 
ways and ultimately from responding violently. 
 It is difficult to imagine a single program for deradicalization on campus 
due to the diversity across the campus ‘cultures’ nationwide where such results 
would need to be implemented since even in a single nation or even city, class 
backgrounds, disciplinary focus, and elite status of educational institutions play 
significant roles in determining the attitudes and motivations of the youth who 
attend them. 
 British education expert Lynn Davies has worked extensively on 
challenges of educating for peace and tolerance in cultures where violence and 
civil war are endemic. She has presented and consulted widely on the 
international level for bodies such as UNESCO. Some of her ideas regarding the 
presentation of religion may be resisted in conservative contexts but let me 
present them here for discussion. Davies observes that: 
 
Extremism is founded on the notion that there is one right answer, truth or 
path, and that there are no alternatives. Conversely, critical education is 
founded on the principle of accepting multiple realities, feeling comfortable 
with ambiguity and searching for multiple truths, not one truth. An 
uncritical respect for beliefs must be superseded by a respect or disrespect for 
actions that are done in the name of these beliefs.47   
 
With that in mind, she advocates: 
1) Intra-religious education—dialogue within a faith and between all the 
various sects, cults, branches, and value systems.  
2) Critical analysis of mistakes made and human rights violations legitimized 
in the name of religion  
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3) Critical analysis of sacred texts to interrogate the more violent or 
misogynistic parts  
Davies’ framing of teaching ‚about‛ religion as part of history, 
psychology, sociology, and international studies and cultures reflects modern 
Western liberal views of the subject. This raises the question of whether in 
Pakistan one can design and offer a curriculum that is faithful to Islamic norms 
and Pakistani culture and yet values diversity of opinions, respect for individual 
differences, and freedom of expression. Decades ago, there was a debate among 
many Muslim thinkers about whether modernization (generally viewed as 
positive and desirable) had to inevitably bring about Westernization (viewed 
negatively as a corrupting influence). In many cases push back occurred against 
ideas or practices that were stigmatized as being Western impositions on Islamic 
societies. Topics such women’s rights or religious pluralism are sometimes still 
resisted as being imposed from outside. In the meantime certain Muslim thinkers 
struggle to recover elements from within Islamic tradition that support such 
perceptions and values, seeing this as being the most productive way forward. 
Aside from resistance to liberal and pluralistic ideas among some 
conservative Muslim today, ‘culture’ itself has been contested in Islamic 
tradition, both in early times and today as a potential source of non-Islamic or 
unIslamic trends and currents. One example of this is the negative valuation of 
non-Islamic culture represented by the term ‚Jāhiliyya‛ meaning the ‘Age of 
Ignorance’. The culture of the pre-Islamic Jāhiliyya Arab tribes before the coming 
of the revelation was considered to be rough, quarrelsome, and ignorant.  In the 
mid-20th century the term ‚Jāhiliyya‛ re-emerged in the writings of Islamists such 
as Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) who condemned what he perceived as a new ignorant 
age, defined by the West or by modernity in secular terms that were challenging 
and changing the face and tastes of Muslim societies and needed to be resisted 
by an Islamization of social and political institutions.  In this model, Islam and its 
corresponding social and political sphere conceived of as an ideal total system or 
a complete way of life set off against a negative, non-Islamic alternative. 
A further example of debates about culture in Islamic tradition involves 
cultural Islamization and the approaches of scholars and jurists adjudicating the 
experiences and practices of Muslims as they expanded to rule or live alongside 
new populations possessing their own indigenous cultures and religions. As 
Islamic empires stretched from Morocco to South East Asia and from Southern 
Europe to Africa, another dimension of the interplay of Islam and culture was 
embodied through the phenomenon of ‚cultural‛ Islamization—the gradual 
assimilation of largely non-Arab pre-Islamic cultural practices, institutions, and 
AFKĀR (June 2019)                                                                                                (Volume: 3, Issue: 1) 
76 
tastes to be more in conformity with the teachings and practices of the Islamic 
religion, including the rule of Islamic law (sharī‘a).  Muslim intellectuals and 
legal experts from the ages of the classical Muslim empires until today—for more 
than a thousand years—have continued to discuss the relationship between 
Islam and culture. 
Many Muslim thinkers, among them Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi, an 18th 
century figure, have struggled with the conceptual tension between the universal 
claims of Islam as the final and complete revelation and the legitimacy and 
persistence of particular historical and cultural articulations of previous 
religions, including the role of pre-Islamic practices.48  The Islamic theology of 
progressive revelation or supercessionism, placed Adam as the first Prophet to 
receive divine guidance. Thus symbolically or theologically we might consider 
that a certain recognition was given to all human cultural expressions as being 
potentially compatible with Islamic norms or at least neutral. In the case of 
perceived conflict of cultural practices with Islam, processes of deliberate 
distortion or misguidance on the part of leaders, historical slippage, or the 
deterioration of the original authentic divine guidance, were invoked as causal 
factors.   
Islam itself was not considered immune to these processes and hence 
terms drawn from the earliest Muslims scriptures were applied to support 
corrective processes such as ‚islāḥ‛ (reform or correction), ‚tajdīd‛ (renewal) and 
‚iḥyā‛ (revival).  In these cases it was not ‚Islam‛ itself that was conceived of as 
being compromised but rather the ‚dīn‛, the sciences of religion, or even the 
umma, the Muslim community.   
Other Muslim thinkers, particularly in the realm of legal theory, have 
debated the extent to which apparently sound or neutral pre-existing cultural 
institutions and practices should be continued or adapted within Islamic 
societies or in some cases imported from outside. In the realm of law, the Muslim 
jurists use the terms ‘āda (custom) and ‘urf (good and acknowledged practice) to 
indicate that culture, including non-Muslim cultural practices, could be 
compatible with Islamic norms, even if they were not directly mandated by its 
codes. 
Their Qur’anic proof text for this was taken from verse 7:199: 
ُمْر ِبا
ۡ
َعْفَو َوا
ْ
ِذ ال
ُ
ج  خ
ْ
ْعِرْض َعِن ال
َ
ُعْرِف َو ا
ْ
 نِلیۡ ِھ ل
‚Accept [from people] what comes naturally [for them]. Command what is 
customarily [good]. And turn away from the ignorant [without responding 
in kind].‛49  
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Legal scholars coined the maxim that ‚cultural usage shall have the 
weight of law‛ and followed the principle that fair judgments must take into 
account the particular cultural realities under which diverse Muslims lived. The 
early Hanafi scholar, Abū Yūsuf (d. 798), and the Medieval Maliki jurist, Shihāb 
al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 1285) are examples of legal scholars who recognized good, 
local, cultural norms as falling under the rubric of the sunna, broadening the 
concept from specific precedents established by the Prophet Muhammad.50 These 
classical Islamic jurists were positive toward culture while maintaining the 
transcendent and shaping role accorded to religion. 
A further example of debates surrounding cultural elements, involves the 
concept of bid’a and the status of cultural products and expressions such as music 
and popular celebrations in Muslim cultures. We find among classical Muslim 
thinkers attitudes that sought to more strictly delimit the bounds of the 
culturally acceptable. This was associated with the religious concept--‚bid’a‛. 
Bid’a connotes the idea of innovation in a negative sense, a heretical innovation 
in doctrine or practice, that attempts to interpolate something that is either alien 
or newly concocted into Islamic belief or practice. On this ground a number of 
cultural practices and even arts and music, totally or in part, were deemed 
beyond the pale of Islamic legitimacy and condemned by some scholars. 
A case illustrating this tension might be the use of music by certain South 
Asian Sufis, the Chishtis, in their rituals.  Sufism is the mystical interpretation of 
the Islamic religion and historically its practices and institutions were very wide 
spread and influential, particularly in areas of the world such as South Asia and 
Africa where they interfaced well with pre-existing local cultures and religious 
attitudes and practices.  Some scholars credit Sufism with enabling the spread of 
Islam due to its friendliness to local languages and practices, and its colorful and 
embodied nature that engaged and absorbed local and folk traditions. Still many 
Muslim religious scholars, classically and today, condemned Sufism as unIslamic 
and deemed practices such as listening to devotional music to be ‚bid’a‛.  
Recently Wahhabism, Salafism and such global puritanical trends have been 
particularly hostile to Sufism and to cultural artifacts and expressions generally, 
in some cases leading to violent attacks and bombings at Sufi shrines and other 
cultural sites and performances. 
Such debates about the permissibility of forms and genres of music and 
art mark Islamic religious debates about culture from very early times until the 
present, indicating another aspect of how the ‚cultural‛ may be construed as 
variously alien, frivolous, hostile, or seductive according to certain 
interpretations of religion. We therefore see on going tensions between the 
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religious realm and the cultural one in many parts of the world, perhaps more 
prominently in the case of Muslims, who have been confronted not only by 
modernity, but by a modernity often defined in culturally alien terms.51 
It is therefore understandable how signs of radicalization on Pakistani 
campuses may be seen in objections to performances of music or artistic 
exhibitions, such that certain individuals and groups try to become enforcers of 
strict religious norms as they understand them and may even resort to threats of 
violence to impose their views on others. 
Most of the literature and cases of ‘deradicalization’ programs and 
strategies in Western societies or in Muslim majority settings have involved 
those already arrested for participation in or contemplating violent actions. 
Speaking of what might be considered evidence for an individual’s 
deradicalization, Kruglanski opines:  
 
What does so qualify is the growing recognition that violence is either 
morally wrong or ineffective as a means of significance attainment or (to a 
lesser degree) that though it may be an appropriate for others, it is no longer 
so for oneself. Disengagement in the latter sense is tantamount to 
deradicalization and in effect constitutes the core of deradicalization. Indeed, 
the major thrust of the various deradicalization programs was precisely to 
delegitimize violence and condemn it morally.52 
 
 This view suggests a need to take a pragmatic approach to 
deradicalization, in addition to changing ethical reasoning about violence. Many 
countries, both Western and majority Muslim, have tried to bring radicals back 
to the mainstream by offering religious and psychological counseling, as well as 
vocational training and help in finding employment.53 
 If we consider these strategies in terms of the context considered here—
Pakistani universities—it seems that the one priority should be analyzing any 
deficiencies in student services, specifically those offering social and 
psychological support. In terms of challenging violence as a solution that is 
religiously legitimated, one must consider enhancing the quality of areas of 
campus life where religious norms and teachings are available to students. In 
many cases Religious Studies or the academic study of Islam may not be 
considered as a academic subject, leaving many students with only exposure to 
simplistic ideas and interpretations about religion, especially Islam, Muslim 
history and civilization. It is as if ideas connected with Islam for many are kept at 
the level of childhood beliefs and forms of reasoning, such that matters of faith 
and ethical thinking using Islamic tools and norms are relegated to blindly 
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following whichever charismatic preacher is in fashion, or to engaging in a rote 
memorization of the terminology of fiqh or ḥadīth studies. 
 The task of university humanities and social science programs is thus in 
some cases remedial, in countering inadequate formation, both in religion and in 
critical thinking, at primary and secondary levels, but also these subjects need to 
be integrated within the broader curriculum of study so that all students, not 
only those majoring in such fields, can benefit from and be empowered by 
deeper and broader understandings of world history and the human condition, 
including their own social and history location. 
 In an essay written almost a generation ago, Western Muslim scholar 
‘Abdul Hakim Murad looks forward to challenges facing Muslim in the ‘new 
millennium’54 In it he decried global trends among Muslims towards favoring 
totalitarian trends, deeming Muslims holding divergent views as bound for Hell 
thereby exhibiting a mentality close to Kharijite ‘takfīr’.  
 This therefore occasions the need to retreat and disown society - the idea 
of Takfīr wa'l-Hijra that informed Shukrī Muṣṭafā's group in late 1970s Egypt. In 
secretive inner circles, the saved elect gather to plan military-style actions against 
the system. They are indifferent to the sufferings of civilians—for they are 
apostates and deserve death anyway. Such attacks will prefigure, in some rather 
vague and optimistic fashion, the coming to power of the true believers, and the 
suppression of all other interpretations of religion. 
 
This idea of takfīr wa'l-hijra is thus, in structural terms, a global 
phenomenon. Its members are usually educated, almost always having 
science rather than arts backgrounds. Technology is not disowned, but 
sedulously cultivated. Bomb-making becomes a disciplined form of worship. 
I believe that this tendency, which has been fostered rather than eliminated 
by the repressiveness of the regimes, will grow in relative significance as we 
traverse the end of the century. It will continue to besmirch the name of 
Islam, by shooting tourists, or blowing up minor targets in pinprick attacks 
that strengthen rather than weaken the regimes. It will divide the Islamic 
movement, perhaps fatally. And it will provide the regimes with an excuse 
further to repress and marginalise religion in society.55 
 
These observations by Murad remain relevant and are pertinent to our 
concerns with university cultures that might fail to disabuse students of neo-
Kharijite thinking. We can see a confluence of cultural, identity, psycho-social, and 
religious frameworks that need to be analyzed and addressed to counter perceptions 
among educated youth that could lead to a valorization of violence in the name of 
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Islam and an acceptance of the demonization of others in the society. 
Also salient for a university milieu is Murad’s assessment that these 
challenges in Muslim societies can best be met through ‚the cultivation of an 
informed leadership.‛ Unfortunately, as Murad opines: 
 
Most Muslim leaders cannot provide the intellectual guidance needed to help 
intelligent young people deal with the challenges of today. Ask the average 
Muslim activist how to prove a post-modernist wrong, and he will not be able to 
help you very much. Our heads are buried in the ground. However, it is not 
only intellectual trends which we ignore. The environment, too, is an 
impending catastrophe which has not grabbed our attention at all. Perhaps our 
activists will still be choking out their rival rhetoric on the correct way to hold 
the hands during the Prayer, while they breath in the last mouthful of oxygen 
available in their countries. They seem wholly oblivious to the problem.56 
 
Murad’s thesis that, ‚Institutions, therefore, urgently need to be established, 
to train young men and women both in traditional sharī‘a disciplines, and in the 
cultural and intellectual language of today's world‛, should remind this audience of 
numerous projects in the not so distant past and present—for example, Sir Sayyid 
Ahmed Khan’s vision for Aligarh University, Muhammad Iqbal’s project of the 
‚reconstruction of religious thought in Islam‛, as well as contemporary experiments 
with forms of ‘enlightened moderation’.  
For Pakistani colleges and universities to take up this mantle and assume 
leadership roles in creating communities and environments where students can 
flourish, both intellectually and in terms of character building and personal well-
being, will take sustained and well-researched efforts on the part of administrators, 
faculty, students and all stake holders in the success of these educational institutions 
and the future of the nation. But it cannot be expected that faculty and upper 
administrators have the skill sets on their own to promote healthy campus cultures. 
Robust and well-trained units of student services and affairs need to be provided, as 
do counseling service units, including something akin to the ‘Muslim chaplain’ role 
emerging in Western university settings. Such roles have developed since having 
religious knowledge alone does not guarantee that an individual religious teacher or 
scholar will have the requisite insights into human psychology and the skills in 
interpersonal relations involved in mentoring youth and other community members. 
Perhaps that is why Western based Muslim scholars like Murad have spent 
so much effort studying and translating the works of figures such as al-Ghazālī in 
the spirit that Muslims need to recover and internalize their own resources for ‘adab’, 
not merely in the sense of literary and cultural appreciation and competency, but 
also for inculcating and inspiring behavioral beauty along the lines of ‘iḥsān’, mercy 
and compassion, and constructive, rather than destructive, activism and criticism. 
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The final element suggested by this review of existing measures to 
deradicalize involves what comes after university study—are there meaningful job 
opportunities, and for this audience, what role do universities play in facilitating the 
employment for their graduates, leaving aside the role of the state and society as a 
whole in this regard? 
Providing resources is going to be challenging for the nation’s universities 
and for policy makers at all levels, including the Higher Learning Commission. Is 
there a broad and sustained consensus, together with adequate resources at the 
provincial and national levels to make the requisite changes? Can universities 
remediate on their campuses, negative results arising from deficiencies of the 
educational system at earlier levels? This is a time to take stock of the false steps of 
the past and see what can be achieved going forward.57 
University educators and administrators must realize the tension between 
the role of the university in cultivating the potential of the ‘radical’ in youth rather 
than crushing or extinguishing it. The radical search for truth may challenge 
frameworks of established knowledge that may blind us to our own complacency 
and intellectual arrogance or laziness. In English—being a ‘radical’ may also have 
the positive connotation of striving to get to the root, essence, or truth of things. In 
Urdu, the term ‘radical’ may be translated by ‚intihāpasand‛—which is more like 
‚extremist‛ or ‚bunyādparast‛ which conveys the idea of being too devoted to or 
absorbed in claiming access to the foundation to the extent of ‚worshipping‛ it. The 
term ‚usūlī‛, however, captures some of the positive connotations of the radical in 
aiming to get to the source, or even of being principled. Pakistan’s universities, when 
both principled and committed to the search for truth, should strive to unfetter the 
intellectual and social abilities of their students while empowering them to 
intellectually and morally reject the dead end of violent extremism. 
 
 
Note: This paper was presented by the author at the three-day International 
Conference on Radicalization: Perceptions, Realities and Challenges of Campus 
Life, organized by Air University Islamabad on 26-28, September, 2018. 
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